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LAW REVIEW
Voi .Mn IV AUGUST, 1929 NUmBEn 3
THE "SALES IN BULK" ACT.
In the Magna Carta will be found what is said to be the first
covenant for the protection of creditors' against fraudulent convey-
ances and other unjust acts of debtors. Since that time the atten-
tion of people through their constituted legislators has been direct-
ed to the enactment of statutes looking toward protection of credi-
tors.2 Among the latest of these have been so-called "Sales in
Bulk" laws, which have now been adopted in one form or another
by the large majority of the states in the Union,3 all of which are
aimed at the defrauding of creditors by the sale of all or substan-
tially all of a merchant's stock of goods and/or fixtures.
In 1901 the Washington Legislature enacted the first "Sales in
Bulk" law4, which was followed by an amendment in 1913' with
the primary object to include "fixtures" within the act. In 1925,
however, at the extraordinary session the whole act was gone
over by the Revision Committee and many substantial changes made
which resulted in the present act.6
Since the enactment of Chapter 135, Session Law of 1925,7 has
in effect materially changed the law of Chapter 109, Laws of 1901,
as amended in 1913, this article will not be limited nor directed
'Magna Carta, June 9th, 1215.
2Stat. 13 Eliz., Stat. Richard II, Edward III, Henry VII which has
been declared part of the Common Law of the United States or re-enacted
in Stat., see 28 Wash. 447, 68 Pac. 961, to say nothing of the adoption of
uniform laws, e. g., Sales, Partnership, Bill of Lading, Negotiable Instru-
ment, and others by a great many states which all in one way or another
have to do with the protection of third party creditors.
327 C. J. Sec. 881, p. 873.
'Washington Statutes, as amended by Laws of 1925, Chapter 135. See
1927 Supplement Rem. Comp. Stat., sec. 5832.
"Laws 1913, p. 608-611.
1 By Authority Senate Joint Resolution No. 6, Laws Ex. Sess. 1925 p.
606, in pursuance to which Mr. Chas. W Gleason of Seattle Bar was ap-
pointed to revise and submit Bill now Rem. Comp. Stat., sec. 5832. The
writer acknowledges sincere appreciation for helpful information given by
Mr. Gleason and use of committee notes.
7 See note 4, supra.
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solely to the end of a resume of the decisions of our own courts,
but will attempt to set forth what the decisions to date have been
here and 6lsewhere in the light of past decisions under similar
laws, and what, possibly, will be the trend of decisions under the
present law to the end that the fullest justice may be done to both
the debtor and the creditor.
I. GENERAL SCHEME OF THE ACT
Primarily, bulk sales acts are designed to prevent fraud on
creditors by secret sale in bulk of all or substantially all of a
merchant's stock of goods, the accepted plan to declare such sales
fraudulent and void, as to creditors of the vendor, or presumptively
so, unless certain formalities such as demanding or giving a list of
creditors and notice to such creditors (either actual or constructive)
are observed, and making it the duty of the vendor, and, in some
states, that of the vendee, to see that the purchase money is applied
to the debts of the vendor." Such a statute is of a penal character
and is in derogation of the common law right to alienate property
without restriction, and was naturally, at once attacked on the
ground that it was unconstitutional, and in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and of like pro-
hibitions contained in several state constitutions. Some of the
earlier acts were declared unconstitutional upon one or more of
the prohibitions contained in the Federal or state constitutions, but
today, with one exception,9 these earlier decisions have been either
overruled or the statutes have been amended until they are now
everywhere recognized as valid except as noted above. 10 Very
early in this state the act was recognized as of a class falling prop-
erly within the police powers," and was declared valid.
II. CLASS OR NATURE OF BUSINESS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE ACT.
At the outset it will be well to consider just what types or kinds
of business organizations come within the scope of the act. All
8McAvoy 'v. Jennings, 44 Wash. 79, 87 Pac. 53 (1906) McDansels v. I
J. Connelly Shoe Co., 30 Wash. 549, 71 Pac. 37, 94 A. S. R. 889, 60 L. R. A.
947 (1902).
9 Black v. Schwartz, 27 Utah, 76 Pac. 22, 101 A. S. R. 971, 65 L. R. A. 308,
1 Ann. Cases 550 (1904) Since the act in Utah does not apply to sales of
the same character by merchants now owing debts, but applies to and ren-
ders criminal the same sales by merchants who are debtors or by persons
in a fiduciary capacity failing to comply with its terms, the act is unconsti-
tutional as class legislation.
"0 The Utah Statute has been amended but not to date passed on.
"See note 8, supra. Also cited and approved in Sherman Clay and Co.
'v. Brown, 131 Wash. 684, 231 Pac. 166 (1924).
SALES IN BULK ACT
businesses, or strictly mercantile businesses? Retailers only, or
also wholesalers and manufacturers? These questions have been
most perplexing to our courts and to our lawyers throughout the
entire history of the act. So much so, in fact, that one of the
primary purposes of the Amendment of 1925 was to more clearly
point out what nature of businesses were to be covered by the act. 2
The first case to reach our Supreme Court'3 was decided in
December of 1902. The direct question therein raised was thd
constitutionality of the act and the remedies of creditors, and not
the nature of the businesses included. In construing the act, the
court said.
"It (the act) was intended to prevent retail 14 dealers m
goods, wares and merchandise from defrauding their credi-
tors and it is well known that the business of retailing
goods, wares and merchandise is conducted largely on
credit and furishes an opportunity to practice fraud
upon creditors not usual n other classes of bussness."
The first case which squarely raised the question as to the nature
of the business, arose in 1904,"' the business therein involved
being a boarding house and restaurant. The court held that it
was within the act, saying- "The evident intent is to prevent fraud
on creditors of people who are engaged in business." The next
case'6 involved the sale of a cash register used in the business of
selling liquors and cigars at retail, which was held not to be within
the act, the court saying- "We think the Legislature intended the
act to apply only to goods belonging to a mercantile stock or supply
which is kept for sale."
Later in the same year another case 7 arose which raised the
question as to whether or not a livery feed and boarding stable
fell within the scope. The court held that it did not. The court
reviewed the Plass case's and undertook to distinguish flour, canned
goods, groceries, etc., purchased by a restaurant and cooked and
fed the customers, from hay, gram, and the like purchased by stable-
men and fed the horses, and based their decision on the ground
that the horses and buggies were not for sale and apparently went
back to the original conception of the act as in the McDansel's'9
"See note 6, supra.
"McDanzels v. J. J. Connelly S1hoe Co., 30 Wash. 549, 71 Pac. 37 (1902).
"Italics are writer's.
P ilass v. Morgan, 36 Walh. 160, 78 Pac. 784 (1904).
"Aibrecht v. Cudihee, 37 Wash. 206, 79 Pac. 784 (1905).
"Everett Produce Co. v. Smith, 40 Wash. 566, 82 Pac. 965, L. R. A.
1917D, 623 N. (1905).
See note 15, supra.
"See note 13, spra.
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case, wherein it was construed as applying only to mercantile busi-
nesses.
Thus it will be seen that within the first four years of the
operation of the act two distinct views had been taken. One that
the businesses which were to be included were those mercantile in
character, and the other that all businesses were included. The
question caused much confusion and doubt, which situation con-
tinued until the Extraordinary Session of the Legislature in 1925
when the Judiciary Revision Committee met the difficulty by
writing the present act, saying
"We believe that this last case 20 should be taken as over-
ruling the Plass case, 21 but not being sure, and be-
lieving that certainty in the law is of almost as great im-
portance as the law itself, we have prepared both of the
revised bills 22 in such language as we believe will make
them apply to mercantile businesses. "
A comparison of the old act with the one written and adopted
will clearly show what the revisors had in mind.
The old act, (Rem. Comp. Stat., Sec. 5835) read
"Any sale goods, wares and merchandise, or
fixtures and equipment, used in and about the busi-
ness of the vendor "
This same language appears in the present act in that part which
sets for the duty of the vendee as to requiring affidavit, etc.,
(Rem. Comp. Stat., Sec. 5832-2), but in section 5832-1 which pur-
ports to define a sale in bulk, (and the definition of what is a sale
in bulk must be taken as classifying the businesses) reads thus.
"Any sale of any stock of goods, wares and mer-
chandise and fixtures and equipment, used in and
about the business of a vendor engaged in the bussness of
buying and selling and dealing in goods, wares and mer-
chandise 23
This comparison taken with the notes before referred to, leaves little
doubt as to what was meant.
It is the almost uniform holding of the courts that manufacturers,
jobbers, canners, wholesalers, and packers are not included.2  As
wSee note 17, supra.
2 See note 15, supra.
2There were two bills prepared, dealing with problem of creditors in
different ways, to be hereinafter noticed, but identical so far as a class of
businesses are concerned.
"Italics are writer's.
2That manufacturers, jobbers, wholesalers and canners are not in-
cluded. See 41 A. L. R. 1214, 46 A. L. R. 982.
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is said in one case .15
"It is clear from the language used that the purpose was
to regulate bulk sales of merchandise as a part of the stock
of a mercantile establishment. It has no application to a
manufacturing plant which sells its product merely as an
incident to the business."
This was under a statute very similar to ours. Additional weight
should be given to the fact that as now written our statute is aimed
exclusively at mercantile businesses. However, a few jurisdictions
have, either expressly or by broad inclusive terms, included manu-
facturers, packers, jobbers, and wholesalers. 26  It is suggested that
it would not include restaurants, hotels, apartments, garages, tea
shops, newspapers, printing shops, farmers, and the like, but would
include that broad field of mercantile establishments engaged in
selling goods, wares and merchandise, viz. grocery stores, clothing
stores, candy shops, stationery shops, general merchandise, depart-
ment stores, and innumerable other kinds which immediately sug-
gest themselves.
Since the enactment of the preceding bill, no case has gone to
our Supreme Court requiring an interpretation on this point, but
it seems probable that in the light of the above clearly expressed
intention of the legislature, the wording of the act as now written,
and the fact that a large majority of other jurisdictions2 confine
the act strictly to mercantile businesses, our courts will definitely
construe the act to have such limits.
III. WHAT Is A SALE iN BULK
A "Sale in bulk" is defined by the 1925 statute as follows .
"Any sale, exchange or transfer, or attempted sale, ex-
change or transfer of all or substantially all of any stock
of goods, wares or merchandise, and/or all or substantially
all of the fixtures and equipment used in and about the
business of a vendor engaged in the business of buying
and selling and dealing in goods, wares, or merchandise of
any kind or description, made out of the usual and ordin-
ary course of business of the vendor; or the sale, exchange
or transfer, or attempted sale, exchange or transfer of sub-
stantially the entire business of buying, selling, and deal-
ing in goods, wares or merchandise, conducted by the ven-
dor; or the sale, exchange, or transfer, or attempted sale,
exchange or transfer of the interest of the vendor in any
"Ramey-Milburm Co. v. Sowch, 159 Ark. 358, 252 S. W 20 (1924)
"Root Refinerzes -v. Gay Oil Co., 171 Ark. 129, 284 S. W 26 (1926).
4 A. L. R. 132, 7 A. L. P. 1587.
See note 4, supra.
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such business, shall be deemed a sale and transfer in bulk
in contemplation of this act Proided, That nothing con-
tained in this act shall apply to sales or transfers of prop-
erty by executors, administrators, receivers or public
officers acting under judicial process."
This section, on analysis, contains the following elements. (1).
"Sale, Exchange or Transfer," or (2) "Attempted Sale, Exchange
or Transfer," or (3) "All or Substantially All of Any Stock of
Goods, Wares and 'Merchandise," and (4) "All or Substantially
All of the Fixtures and Equipment Used in and About the Busi-
ness," and that the sale must be (5) "Out of the Ordinary Course
of Business of Buying, Selling, and Dealing," or (6) "Sale, Ex-
change, or Transfer, or Attempted Sale, Exchange, or Transfer of
Vendor's Interest in Such Business."
IV "SALE, EXCHANGE OR TRANSFER."
As a general proposition it is said that
"A sale includes any transfer of personal property for a
valuable consideration, without reference to the particular
mode in which the consideration is paid.2 9"
The same case also held that "Barter", as distinguished from a
technical sale was within the meaning of the Bulk Sales Act.
It will be noted that our statute in section one of the old act
(Rem. Comp. Stat., Sec. 5832), and in section two of the new act
(Rem. Comp. Stat., See. 5832-2), in setting out the duties of the
buyer, makes specific mention of a "bargain for, or purchase of,
by a vendee for cash or on credit." As a result of this, the ques-
tion very properly arose as to whether or not a" Sale or Transfer"
(as under the old act) to be within the act, had to be one for
cash or credit. In 1918 a case arose 0 involving the transfer of
corporate stock in exchange for an entire business, the deal being
made without any fraudulent intent to a corporation organized to
take over the business in consideration of the capital stock. This
was held not to be within the act on the ground that the transfer
was not for "cash or credit", but for stock, which was as avail-
able for satisfaction of creditors after the transfer of merchandise
as before. However, it was intimated in that case that cash or
credit might be reasonably construed to include, or be equivalent
of commercial paper, bonds, warrants, and other securities be-
cause of their easy disposition and negotiability 81
2Galluts v. Einery, 193 Mass. 106, 78 N. E. 782, 8 Ann. Cas. 1067 (1906)
Al Mishell v. Sgpokane Cycle Co., 100 Wash. 16, 170 Pac. 35, L. R. A. 1915C
929 (1918).
Hartung v. Rushing, supra.
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It is not entirely easy to understand m what respect stocks
(winch may or may not be freely negotiable) differ from "bonds,
commercial paper" and the like, so far as consideration and pur-
chase price are concerned. Neither is it entirely easy to under-
stand why it was necessary to hold that the "sale or transfer" must
be for "cash or credit", since the latter terms appear only m con-
nection with the duties of the buyer and seller, and they do not
clearly appear to be logically (much less, necessarily) connected
with the definition of what is or what is not a sale m bulk. Cer-
tainly, under the Amendment of 1925, which added the word
"exchange" to the definition, giving it the broad qualification of
"any Sale, Exchange or Transfer", there would seem to be brought
within the scope of the act all those cases wherein no purchase
money or credit or its equivalent passed, but m which there was,
nevertheless, an exchange of value,82 as, for example, the exchange
of a house for a store's goods and equipment, a farm for an haber-
dashery The Uniform Sales Act, winch since 1925 has been the
law of this state also contemplates that a sale may be an exchange
for value. 83 In the Darels case 4 it was said that all that was
necessary to take the case out of the statute was that "no purchase
money should pass." In that case, following prior cases, it was
held that the transfer of a stock of goods by an individual in pay-
ment of a pre-existing debt for the purpose of preferring the re-
cipient creditor did not violate the bulk sales law. Whether this
line of authority is affected by the recently adopted rule of the
court that a transfer of property for a pre-existing debt 85 is a pur-
chase for value seems an open question.
A commercial assignment by a failing debtor of his stock of
merchandise for benefit of creditors, or such of them as complied
with certain specified conditions, is not a sale within the meaning
of the act."5 Also, citing and approving the above rule, it was
held that such an assignee is not a purchaser of the goods W9 Bulk."'
What then, is the status of such an assignee since he is neither pur-
chaser or vendee? This question was squarely passed on, and it
2McAvoy 'v. Jennings, 44 Wash. 79, 87 Pac. 53 (1906) Kasper v. Spo-
kane Merchants' Association, 87 Wash. 447, 151 Pac. 800 (1915) Norris V.
Anderson, 134 Wash. 403, 235 Pac. 966 (1925) Daniels v. Pacific Brewing
&Malting Co., 86 Wash. 416, 150 Pac. 609 (1915).
31Rem. Comp. Stat. (1927'Supp.), sec. 5836-1 et seq.
"See note 32, supra.
'Long v. McAvoy, 133 Wash. 472, 236 Pac. 800. (1925).
"McAvoy v. Jennings, 44 Wash. 79, 87 Pac. 53 (1906).
"Kasper v. Spokane Merchants' Association, 87 Wash. 447, 151'Pac. 800
(1915).
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was held that since the creditors have no specific lien on the goods,
and a sale is nevertheless a sale, and title will pass, but as to
creditors, it is conclusively fraudulent and void, and hence, the
assignee in such a case takes title in trust for the creditors.38
But whether this construction applies to all assignments for bene-
fit of creditors is questionable, because it has generally been held to
be limited to only valid statutory assignments provided by law for
failing debtors.3 9 Indeed, in the case of first impression m this
state40 it was expressly confined to a debtor "in failing circum-
stance."
It has been almost uniformly held that a chattel mortgage of
goods in Bulk which operates only to secure a lien, title remaining
in mortgagor, is not a sale, transfer, exchange or assignment within
the meaning of those terms as used in the Bulk Sales Statute." A
contrary result is reached if mortgage passes title.
42
Private sales at public auction are not apparently within the
statute,4" the reason for the rule being given
"Unless we adopt this view, the sale of one's goods and
chattels at public auction conveys no title to the purchaser
though the sale and purchase are made in good faith. And
in this connection it is difficult to comprehend how a pur-
chaser at such a sale can comply with the terms of the
statute which require that a buyer shall make inquiry of
the vendor list creditors send 10-day notice of in-
tended purchase. It needs no argument to demonstrate
how absurd it would be to attempt to fit these require-
ments of the statute to a purchase made at a public
auction. "
The above quotation was made in the light of a statement of
the general rule that since the statute was in derogation of the
common law it should be strictly construed and not extended to a
31 Norr s v. Anderson, 134 Wash. 403, 235 Pac. 966 (1925)
39 Hangh0gheny, etc., Coal Co. v. Anderson, 186 Mich. 349, 152 N. W
1025 (1915), where it said it was unnecessary to decide whether Bulk Sales
Law applied to valid assignment for benefit of creditors. Humphrey v.
Coquillard Wagon Works, 37 Okla. 714, 132 Pac. 899 (1913).
See note 8, supra.
1 Hannah & Hogg v. Richter Brewing Co., et al., 149 Mich. 220, 112 N. W
713 (1907) Dill v. Zhey, 27 Okla. 584, 112 Pac. 973, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 455(1910) Des Motnes Packing Co. v. Uncaphar 174 Iowa 39, 156 N. W 171
(1916) 5 Minnesota Law Review, 557.
" Lnn County Bank v. Davs et al., 103 Kan. 672, 175 Pac. 973 (1918).
11 Schwartz v. King Realty, etc., Co., 93 N. J. L. 111, 107 Atl. 154 (1919).
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transaction which does not come clearly within its terms. The point
seems never to have been passed on in this jurisdiction. Granting
all which the New Jersey court has to say, it is submitted that the
learned court fails to perceive that the statute, in its general
scope is aimed to protect creditors, not buyers, and that mere
"difficulty of compliance with its terms" hardly seems sufficient
to justify the conclusion reached. A sale is a sale, whether it be
public or private. In either case a creditor is left equally unpro-
tected when sold in bulk.
The statute has.been also held not to apply where a failing debtor
has transferred his stock of goods in bulk in preference of one of
his creditors, where the stock transferred is of less value than the
preferred debt.44  The decision in that case is predicated on a pre-
vious case45 announcing "that any debtor in failing circumstances
may pay or secure one or more of his creditors to the exclusion
of other equally meritorious, even if by so doing he exhausts the
whole of his property ,,46
V "ATTEMPTED SALE OR EXCHANGE"
It is difficult to understand just what could have been in the
mind of the legislature when the clause "attempted sale, exchange
or transfer" was inserted in the act of 1925. If the sale was com-
pleted and met with the other conditions of the, act, naturally it
would fall within it and the creditor would have the remedies avail-
able as provided for. On the other hand, if the sale were not com-
pleted, but was such a transaction as fell just short of being a sale,
and, therefore, an "attempt" at a sale, it would seem that the
creditor would likewise be protected because of the fact that the
title still remained in the vendor and subject to all the remedies
which the creditor had before the attempted sale.
Nowhere in the notes of the 1925 Revision Committee appears
any suggestion as to what was meant by an "attempted sale, ex-
change or transfer", but it was suggested by the draftsman 47 of the
bill, that, as near as he could recollect, this clause was inserted
with the purpose in mind that it would prevent any attempt by a
vendor, after the act had been invoked by ins creditors, to engage
in evasion by declaring that the sale was only an "attempted" one.
An examination of the statutes of the various states fails to dis-
,1 Peterson v. Doak, 43 Wash. 251, 86 Pac. 663 (1906) Damels v. Pacific
Brewing and Malting Co., 86 Wash. 416, 150 Pac. 609 (1915).
"Victor v. Glover, 17 Wash. 37, 48 Pac. 788, 40 L. R. A. 297 (1897)
"See note 35, supra.
"See note 6, supra.
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close a like or similar clause, and as there has been no interpreta-
tion of it in this state, we are left to ponder upon both the intent
and the effect which this clause will have.
VI. "ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL."
To be a sale in bulk, the goods passed must be all or substantially
all of the merchant's entire stock. "Substantially all" has been
taken by the courts to mean not "practically all", but "substan-
tially all" of the merchant's controlling interest. Hence a sale of
a half interest by a merchant for the purpose of taking in the
vendee as his partner is within the act.48  While there is some con-
flict on this point, the general tendency is in accordance with the
above holding, especially so where the debtor sold his half interest
at one time and then later the remaining half interest to the same
person.4 9 Sales in job lots are not within the act50 and in line with
that theory three separate sales aggregating less than the whole
were held not within the statute." This class of cases might also
be justified on grounds that the sales were not out of the usual
course of business. So, when one conducted a drug store separate
and apart from his general store, the sale of the drug store was held
to be within the act.52 This was on the theory that it was a sale of an
independent business, and that it did not matter that the above is
in line with the decisions in this jurisdiction in which our court has
held that a merchant who sold out his stock at auction to the extent
of one hundred and seventy dollars and a short time later sold the
balance of his stock for the lump sum of three hundred and seven
dollars, should have complied because of the latter sale.53 Again,
a sale of one-half interest in a business and a stock of goods con-
stitutes a sale in bulk but the sale of a portion of the stock of a
general retail piano store and music house consisting of only five to
seven per cent of the value of the entire stock is not within the
act, notwithstanding the fact that such sale included all of the sheet
music and the sheet music business.54 This case was followed by
"Marlow v. Ringer 79 West Virginia 568, 91 S. E. 386, L. R. A. 1917D
619 (1917) See 11 Minnesota Law Review 668.
11 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Bauchelle, 12 Ga. App. 661, 78 S. E.
51 (1913).
" Sabin v. Horenstesn, 260 Fed. 754 (1919).
M Carpenter v. Karnow, 193 Fed. 762 (1911).
Young v. Lemieux, 79 Conn. 434, 65 AtI. 436, 600, 129 A. S. R. 193, 20
L. R. A. (N. S.) 160, 2 Ann. Cases 452 (Aff. 211 U. S. 489) 53 L. Ed. 295
(1907)
53 Fitzberry v. Munter 33 Wash. 629, 74 Pac. 1003 (1903).
Blanchard Co. v. Ward, 124 Wash. 204, 213 Pac. 929, 33 A. L. R. 59
(1923)
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a holding that sale of a shop only to the amount of about fifteen
hundred dollars out of a disputed stock, the value of which was
between six thousand and twenty thousand dollars, was not within
the statute.5 5 Hence, it would appear that, as indicated above, the
object, and the practical results or effects of the sale are to, be
looked to rather than a strict interpretation of what is "substan-
tially all" of a stock of goods. If the sale is one which naturally
divests the vendor of the controlling interest, or in any other way
alienates is right, title and interest to the extent that the creditors
are jeopardized, it would appear that the court would hold it to be
a substantial part of the goods rather than to require the act to
be one which disposes of "practically all" of the stock of goods,
wares or merchandise.
VII. GooDs, WAREs AND Hm.&NNsE--WHAT CosTrruTEs
This term is substantially the same as a stock of merchandise for
sale, and in its general application includes all classes of commodi-
ties kept for sale in the ordinary course of business or something
that is sold every day and is constantly going out and being re-
placed by other goods."8 It applies only to those goods consisting
of the mercantile stock or supply kept for sale.57 Generally, by great
weight of authority, it has been held not to include "fixtures" of a
business unless specifically included.58 Our Legislature specifically
covered this point by including "fixtures and equipment" in the
1913 amendment.79
Examination of the statutes discloses but a few cases which in-
elude "fixtures," and just what is to be included as "fixtures" in
a mercantile business under the bulk sales act appears never to
have been directly passed upon by our court. Generally, it may be
said that the term "fixtures" must ordinarily and within the gen-
eral intent of the act, include only "trade fixtures", that is to say,
only such fixtures as are used in and about the business to better
enable the merchant to store, handle and display his wares, al-
though such fixtures are removable without injury to the prennses.6"
EFudge v. Brown, 126 Wash. 475, 218 Pac. 251 (1923).
"Botse Credit MeW's Assoctation v. Ellis, 26 Idaho 438, 144 Pac. 6, L. R.
A. 1915E 917 (1914)
TAlbrecht v. Cudihee, 37 Wash. 206, 79 Pac. 628 (1905). Also note 14,
supra. Everett Produce Go. v. Smith Bros., 40 Wash. 566, 82 Pac. 905, 111
A. S. R. 979, 5 Ann. Cases 798, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 331 (1905).
" Gallas v. Eliner, 93 Mass. 106, 78 N. E. 772, 8 Ann. Cases 1067 & N.
(1906).
1 Chapter 175, Laws of 1913, pp. 608-611.
'Brown v. Qungley, 165 Mich. 337, 130 N. W 690, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 218
(1911) 27 C. J. 881.
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The above, therefore, would seem to include all store fixtures, and
office fixtures. The "equipment" covered by the act is that "used
in and about the business of a vendor." Of course, the business in
the first place must be such a one as falls within the act.
VIII. "OUT OF USUAL COURSE OF BUSINESS."
This phrase operates more as a check upon the first phrase of
the section ("sale of all or substantially all") because in some
classes of businesses a sale in the regular course of business might
be such as to constitute all or practically all of a merchant's stock,
which, without the above modification, would bring such sale within
the act, since the joinder of the "fixtures" idea is by the disjunc-
tive. If the sale is one which constitutes a passing of title of all
or substantially all of the business contemplated by the act and is
not in the regular course and conduct of the business of buying,
selling and replacing with more goods or fixtures, then clearly it
would be out of the usual course, of business.
IX. WHO IS A CREDITOR.£
A. In General
The question involving this proposition is whether the creditors
of the business should be construed as being general creditors of
the vendor or to be more strictly construed and applied to those
creditors only who have contributed to the stock of goods, wares
and merchandise. This proposition was presented to our Supreme
Court in 190461 and was followed by a long line of decisions, the
last of which was decided in 1921. 62 All of these decisions followed
the early case holding that all the creditors of the vendor were to
be included, the court saying
"That the act applied to all creditors of the vendor and
the attempt of the Legislature to limit its application to
creditors holding claims for goods sold upon credit or on
account of money borrowed to carry on the business, was
ineffective for the reason that it was not a part of the sub-
stantive law but appeared only in a form of affidavit con-
tained within the act."
Commenting upon this holding and the statement above set out,
the Legislative Revision Committee in its notes6 s presenting the
revised bill at the Extraordinary Session in 1925 said
"Eklund v. Hopkzns, 36 Wash. 179, 68 Pac. 787 (1904).
12 Phillips v. Verbeke, 117 Wash. 173, 200 Pac. 1091 (1921).
"See note 6, supra.
SALES IN BULK ACT
"No matter what the legislative intent was in the strict
sense-the intent in fact was to limit its application to
business creditors and not to general creditors."
It was further stated that they were preparing two bills, one of
which was to include the general creditors as within the act, and
the other to apply only to business creditors. The latter bill or
"Business Creditors' Bill" was the one adopted by the Legisla-
ture with the result and effect of a complete about-face as to who
are creditors. Just who are to be included within the act as busi-
ness creditors is, of course, to be seen. The act suggests that they
will be only those creditors of the vendor to whom the vendor may
be indebted for or on account of any goods, wares or merchandise,
and/or fixtures and equipment used in and about the business of
the vendor purchased on credit, or for or on account of money bor-
rowed to carry on the business of such vendor. This would seem
to exelude a large class of the creditors who promote the business
of the vendor and materially increase the possibility of profits,
and yet who do not furnish goods, wares or merchandise and/or
fixtures or equipment, or lend money to carry on the busi-
ness. They should be included because they have contributed to
the conduct of the business, for example a newspaper which fur-
nishes advertising to a merchant, a public utility which furnishes
service, and other business organizations which will immediately
suggest themselves. It may be, however, that these businesses will
be included as creditors on the basis that goods, wares and mer-
chandise include all services performed and rendered for a busi-
ness as well as a material stock of goods, wares and merchandise.
The creditors who apparently will be excluded under the act of
1925 are those who have performed services or furnished goods
to the proprietor of a business in another capacity than as the
owner of the business, for example: the equipment for his private
automobiles, groceries for his home, doctors, and many other credi-
tors of like nature.
B. In Particular
It has been decided that a vendor in a conditional sales contract
who has elected to stand on the contract and not retake the property
is a creditor.8 4 So also is one who takes a note secured by mort-
'4Btewart d- Hotmes Drug (7o. 'v. Reed, 74 Wash. 401, 113 Pac. 577 (1913).
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gage on real estate a creditor within the meaning of the act.65
This latter decision could be questioned under the new act on the
ground that as to the transaction involved he is a general creditor
of the vendor and not a business creditor, and also that the trans-
action itself is not of a class of business which falls within the act.
A purchaser of a garage business who demands and receives a
statement of actual creditors cannot be held liable for omission of
a disputed claim consisting of a loan to an employee who had rep-
resented himself as the owner of a business.6" Clearly, the loan here,
if used in and about the business, would represent a claim as a
business creditor, but the case from the standpoint of the class of
business involved in the transaction would no longer be law for the
reason that a garage business apparently is not such a one as falls
within the act.
The fact that one is a creditor of the vendor must be clearly
shown and cannot be established by inference.6 7 A sale which
would constitute one a creditor of the business must be complete,
it being held that one to whom an order for five thousand cigars
had been given for future delivery is not a creditor of the party
giving the order until some portion of the goods has been de-
livered . 8 A creditor also must be a creditor of the business at the
time of the sale and not, of course, a creditor whose claim arises
subsequent to the date of the Bulk Sale or one who has no claim
upon the assets of the business sold. For example, the holder of
a note of a partner which was made before the partnership was
formed, is not a creditor of such partnership, and is not within the
act.
X. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES-AS BETWEEN PURCHASER AND CREDITOR
It is to be kept in mind that the statute expressly voids and
makes fraudulent any sale in bulk which has not observed the re-
quirements of the act, 1. e. creditors, pro rata, before payment of
the price, or its equivalent in negotiable instruments, or, under the
new act, an exchange or transfer as hereinbefore suggested. Such
compliance must be substantial.69 It may be advisable to here
point out that exacting of the affidavit does not excuse mandate
Gregg v. Russrnger 110 Wash. 680, 188 Pac. 765, 193 Pac. 237 (1920).
Wooley v. Chandler 115 Wash. 86, 196 Pac. 643 (1921)
Peterson v. Doak, 43 Wash. 251, 86 Pac. 663 (1906)08Hardwick -v. Gettier 43 Wash. 644, 86 Pac. 943 (1906).
09 Stuart v. Elk Horn Bank, etc., Co., 123 Ark. 285, 185 S. W 263, Ann.
Cas. 1918A 268 (1918).
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of seeing that the purchase money is applied share and share alike
to bona fide claims of creditors, as shown by statement filed, and
if purchaser fails to do so he is liable pro rata part to each creditor
of the amount paid by purchaser to vendor.70 Consequently, a
purchaser in violation of the Bulk Sales Act acquires no rights in
property purchased as against creditor of seller,71 and in this
state he was early held to be a trustee for benefit of all creditors
T2
and responsible for disposition of the goods.
In most jurisdictions, including Washington, mere violation of
the statute does not of itself impose a personal liability on the pur-
chaser 7 3 it being stated that where a list is not demanded, creditor's
action is one of attachment or garnishment, and not directly
against the vendee at law.74 Where the statute requirements have
not been observed, the purchaser is liable to creditor personally,
if he resells or otherwise disposes of them, and creditor need not
first, in such case, pursue goods. 75 The same attitude is taken
where goods have been lost or so commingled that they cannot be
identified. Generally this personal liability is to the extent of
the value of the goods, received, but no further, but it is to be noted
that the amount is not limited to the value received by a vendee
in the resale.
In construing the mandatory terms of our statute that unless the
statute is complied with the sale "shall be fraudulent and void,"
the court has declared 7 that it constitutes a substantive rule of law,
and not one of evidence, and is conclusively fraudulent and void,
good faith being immaterial, and can only be rebutted by showing
actual compliance.
Even in such case the title passes between vendor and vendee, it
being fraudulent and void only as to the creditor.7  Hence a vendee
of a vendee, if a bona fide purchaser for value, stands free and
clear, in which case the remedy would be against the original
vendee personally as for conversion, it being heretofore said that
he takes as a trustee.7 8
10 Spokane Merchants Assoc. v. Kosha, 118 Wash. 445, 203 Pac. 696
(1922).
"Dean v. Bowles, 110 Miss. 575, 70 So. 693 (1916).
1Kohn v. Fishback, 36 Wash. 69, 78 Pac. 199, 104 A.S. R. 941 (1905).
7Rothschild -v. Trewella, 36 Wash. 679, 79 Pac. 480, 124 A. S. R. 973, 68
L. R. A. 281 (1905)
T, See note 71, supra.
Friedmann v. Branner, 62 Wash. 338, 130 Pac. 360 (1913).
"Kaspcr v. Spokane Merchants' Association et a?., 87 Wash. 447, 151 Pac.
800 (1915).
"Norris v. Anderson, 134 Wash. 403, 235 Pac. 966 (1925).
1, See note 48, supra.
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It may be here noted also that since title does pass, the seller can
not hide behind the statute as against his vendee.7 9 The converse
is also true as where vendee attempts to assert a lien for money
paid, as he is equally at fault in the sale."'
As has already been suggested, the remedy of creditors is not per-
sonal against the purchaser unless the purchaser has in some way
dealt with the goods (as by resale) so as to personally become
liable81 The proper remedy is by garnishment, execution, attach-
ment or in eqmty Hence, if the goods can be found, they may be
levied against or attached directly as though no sale had occurred.
As the theory on which the remedy by garnishment is grounded
is that the purchaser of the goods sold in violation of the bulk sales
act is regarded as a trustee for the creditors it has been held that
the creditor may hold the garnishee for the funds coming into his
hands in case he has disposed of the goods, it being immaterial that
the goods have been sold by the garnishee before service of the
garnishment summons.82 It was held in the case just cited that an
answer of "no goods" by the garnishee was no answer, saying
"It is true, the garnishee answered, and probably in
accordance with the facts, that he did not at that time have
any of the property of the defendant in his possession, and
that he was not indebted to him. But, m contemplation
of law, he had the property of the defendant in his hands,
because, having purchased property in fraud of law, with-
out complying with the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act,
he stood in the position of a trustee of the property, re-
sponsible to the cestui trust or the creditors for the dispo-
sition of such property "
In view of this statement it would seem, also, that the funds
derived from such resale would stand impressed with a like trust.
If a vendor has sold out in violation of the statute, and there-
after absconded, it has been held that the creditors may file a credi-
tor's bill in equity 83
Replevin will not lie by a creditor against the vendee because the
property is wholly in the vendee, but replevin will lie against a
creditor by the vendee where the creditor has in protecting his claim
' Albright v. Stockhill, 208 Mich. 468, 175 N. W 252 (1919).
'Farrar v. Tonsly Lumber Co., 149 Mich. 118, 112 N. W 726 (1907)
"See note 73, supra. Also Friedman v. Bronner 72 Wash. 338, 130 Pac.
360 (1913)
3"Kohn v. Fishback, 36 Wash. 69, 78 Pac. 199 (1904).
Galley v. McGahey et al., 181 Mich. 225, 148 N. W 356, Ann. Cas. 1916C
929 and note (1914).
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attached or garnished the goods and in such suit the validity of
the sale may be determined."
In this connection, it may be well to note that in those jurisdic-
tions where the act does not specifically indicate a limitation upon
time of creditors' right, and for recovery, it has been generally held
that the remedies by way of attachment, garnishment and execution
are within the bar of such statutory limitations.8 5  The question
seems nevef to have been passed on in tns jurisdiction, but the
reasoning of the court in those cases wherein it has been decided
seems sound.
XI. LIABIITY OF VENDOR FOR FALSE STATEMENT OF CREDITOR.
To give full effect to the act and provide "sharp teeth" a vendor
of the stock of goods must prepare an affidavit verified under oath
setting out therein a statement of all has creditors, together with
the amount of indebtedness due or to become due, and to the further
effect that there are no other creditors and that there are no others
except those set forth, and that the matters set forth in the affidavit
are within the personal knowledge of the vendor. In a subsequent
section 8 it is provided that if the vendor shall "knowingly or wil-
fully make or deliver, or cause to be made or delivered, a statement
as provided for which shall not include the names of all of the
creditors of such vendor, together with their addresses and accurate
amounts due and to become due, and which shall contain any false
statement, shall be deemed guilty of perjury " The creditors, of
course, herein referred to are only those who are within the con-
templation of the act.
As to the sufficiency of the affidavit which is given, the court
has said that while the act is to be strictly construed, the affidavit
will not be held insufficient because details not going to the sub-
stance of the matter therein contained happen to be omitted, and
it will be sufficient if anyone reading such affidavit does not detect
a non-compliance with the act.8 7 The affidavit must be sworn to
before a notary public, and the notary's seal must be attached as
required in Section 9904 of Rem. Comp. Stat. governing instru-
ments other than those to be used in court.88
"Kett v. Mosher, 86 N. J. L. 97, 90 At. 243 (1914).
15Riley Reun. Oil Co. v. Sym onds, 195 Mo. App. 111, 190 S. W 1038
(1916) Douglas Candy Co. v. Shenk, 195 Mo. App. 592,194 S. W 754 (1917)
Dechenson v. Harbtson, 78 N. J. L. 37, 72 At. 941 (1909).
'Rem. Comp. Stat., sec 5832-2.
Thompson v. Nakainjra, 128 Wash. 637, 223 Pac. 1055 (1924).
State v. Epstesn, 138 Wash. 118, 244 Pac. 388 (1926).
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As to what reliance a vendee must place upon this affidavit, it is
said that if he does not know there are any creditors and is in-
formed that there are none, he is warranted in depending on the
affidavit of the vendor.8 9 Construing this section as a whole, it would
appear that in order for an action for perjury to lie against a ven-
dor, he must have knowingly and wilfully left out a creditor. Con-
sequently one who has inadvertently left out a creditor would not
be liable to the penalty unless such leaving out could be construed
an act of such negligence that he ought to have known that he was
leaving such creditor out. However, this question has, so far as a
search of the statutes determined, never been passed upon by our
court or any other court. It is necessarily wise for any vendor to
make a very careful examination of his accounts payable before
submittting a statement under oath, lest he subject himself to the
punishment of a felony
XII. DUTY oF BunRa AND SELLER.
No attempt will be made here to set out in detail the duties of
the buyer and seller necessary to a complete compliance with the
act. Those duties can best be understood by a reading of the appro-
priate sections themselves-but it may not be amiss to set down
the various "steps" or conditions which each party to the transac-
tion must perform.
1. The buyer before paying the seller must,
a. demand and receive a verified list of sellers' creditors.
b. demand seller to furnish such statement under oath,
according to the affidavit set forth in the act.
c. buyer must file said statement in office of county audi-
tor where goods or fixtures are located, and filing
to be five days before consummation purchase.
d. The statement to be indexed as chattel mortgage, ven-
dor as mortgagor, vendee as mortgagee.
e. must apply purchase price pro rata to bona fide claims
of creditors.
2. The seller must,
a. Give to buyer list of creditors and liabilities under oath
and according to form prescribed.
b. Or produce written waiver of this act from creditors.
It might be well to here draw a brief comparison between the
89 Frend v. Rosendfeld-Revwg Co., 87 Wash. 329, 151 Pac. 776 (1915).
SALES IN BULK ACT
above steps and procedure required by our statute and the several
requisites to compliance with the statutes in other jurisdictions. 0
Speaking generally, there are three broad classes into winch the
various acts fall, viz, 1. Connecticut form, 2. New York form, 3.
Pennsylvania form. Our statute substantially follows the Connec-
ticut form, but embodies, also, some of the features (to be herein-
after noted) of the Pennsylvania form. Arizona, California and
Montana are also within this class.
The Pennsylvania form is the most comprehensive in scope and
at the present time most favored9 1 It is substantially the New York
form (which has been followed by thirty-three states), except that
ten days' notice to creditors is required instead of five as under
the New York form. In many respects it also includes provisions
found in our act-viz., statement under oath as to creditors, the
transaction "fraudulent and void" if not complied with, proceeds
to be applied pro rata to debts, willful false statement a nnsde-
meanor; creditor may waive provisions. But in addition to the
above requirements the seller must furnish, to the creditors, an
inventory and cost price of goods sold, and imposes upon the
assignee or purchaser the duty to notify the creditors either person-
ally or by registered mail, in New York five days before the pur-
chase and in Pennsylvania ten days before the transfer.
The above comparison discloses one radical difference between
the Washington statute and that followed in the large majority of
other states, namely in the manner by which notice of the impend-
mg sale is brought to the attention of the creditors. Under the
New York and Pennsylvania form by actual notice, either person-
ally or by registered mail. Under our statute by constructive notice,
by recording. In tins respect it is thought the Washington act is
weak and may be justly criticized because by requiring only con-
structive notice it leaves wide open a backdoor through which many
designing debtors may escape the practical results aimed at, viz.,
the protection of creditors. A few illustrations will suffice to make
tins clear- The A wholesale company in Spokane has been selling
goods to B merchant in X town. X town is thirty miles from the
county seat and two counties removed from Spokane. There is but
a weekly paper in the county seat wherein X is located, winch paper
10 For detail discussion of this comparison see 77 U. Penn. Law Review
72 (1928).
' MoisrGomnny--"Bulk sales law as it was intended to be and as it is,"
25 Credit Monthly 8 (1923).
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does not carry a complete resume of county recordations. What
chance or opportunity has A to know of the recording of the pro-
posed sale 9 Especially where only five days' notice is required?
A suburban merchant of King County has been selling to B subur-
ban merchant. Neither business is large enough to warrant the
burden of clipping notices which appear m several publications.
What practical chance has A to protect himself from B's sale. True,
in both cases the creditors still have the "right" to pursue the
goods, or debtor, but no one will seriously contend that this is, m
the large majority of cases, an effective right, productive of a full
return.
In view of the above it is to be hoped that our legislature will
provide an adequate requirement for personal notice to creditors.
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